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Channel Coordination in the Presence of a Dominant Retailer
Abstract
The retail trade today is increasingly dominated by large, centrally managed “power retailers.” In this paper, we
develop a channel model in the presence of a dominant retailer to examine how a manufacturer can best
coordinate such a channel.
We show that such a channel can be coordinated to the benefit of the manufacturer through either quantity
discounts or a menu of two-part tariffs. Both pricing mechanisms allow the manufacturer to charge different
effective prices and extract different surpluses from the two different types of retailers, even though they both
have the appearance of being “fair.” However, quantity discounts and two-part tariffs are not equally efficient
from the manufacturer’s perspective as a channel coordination mechanism. Therefore, the manufacturer must
judiciously select its channel coordination mechanism.
Our analysis also sheds light on the role of “street money” in channel coordination. We show that such a
practice can arise from a manufacturer’s effort to mete out minimum incentives to engage the dominant
retailer in channel coordination. From this perspective, we derive testable implications with regard to the
practice of street money.
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distribution channels, channel power, channel coordination
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Technical Note: Alternative Model Specification
Consider a dominant-retailer channel characterized by the following demand functions:
Qd = γ(α− βp) + s, (1)
Qc = (1− γ)(α − βp), (2)
Qm = α− βp + s. (3)
Relative to the model speciﬁed in our paper, this speciﬁcation essentially increases the incentive for
the dominant retailer to provide s at any given cost f , since the dominant retailer’s demand can
be written as Qd = γ(α−βp+ s)+ (1− γ)s, and eliminates any free-riding on s by fringe retailers.
1. Integrated Channel
As the channel demand remains the same under this alternative model speciﬁcation, the price and
proﬁt for the integrated channel are the same as in our paper . We have for the integrated channel:
Π∗(s, f) =
(α− βc + s)2
4β
− f , (4)
p∗ =
α + βc + s
2β
, Q∗m =
α− βc + s
2
, (5)
where c is the marginal cost of production.
2. Channel Conﬂict
By following the same procedures as in our paper, we can derive the equilibrium for this alternative
model when the channel is not coordinated. Toward that end, we assume γ > 12 , c > (
1
γ − 1)s,
α > βc+2(2n +1)s, n ≥ 2, and f < fc. We maintain these assumptions throughout this technical
note. Futher to simplify our notation, deﬁne
fa =
s[γ(α− βc) + 2(1 − γ)s]
4βγ
, (6)
fb =
s[aγ − βcγ + 2s− 2γs +√(2γ − 1)s(2αγ − 2βcγ − s + 2γs)]
4βγ
, (7)
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Table 1: Equilibrium for Decentralized Channel
Merchandising Merchandising
(0 ≤ f ≤ fa) (fa < f ≤ fb)
p˜ γ(3α+βc+2s)+s4βγ
4αγs+3s2−4βγf
4βγs
w˜ γ(α+βc+2s)−s2βγ
s(2αγ+s)−4βγf
2βγs
π˜m
(αγ−βcγ+2γs−s)2
8βγ2
[4βfγ+(4γ−3)s2][s(2αγ+s)−2βγ(2f+cs)]
8β(γs)2
π˜d
[γ(α−βc)+(3−2γ)s]2
16βγ − f (s
2−4βγf)2
16βγs2
π˜c
(1−γ)[γ(α−βc−2s)−s][r(a−βc)+(3−2γ)s]
16βγ2
(1−γ)(4βγf−3s2)(4βfγ+s2)
16β(γs)2
fc =
s(2αγ − 2βcγ + s)
4βγ
, (8)
fd =
s[γ(α− βc) + (1− γ)s]
4βγ
. (9)
Our analysis shows that when fb < f < fc, the equilibrium is such that s is not provided. In this
case, we have (using the same notation as in our paper)
p˜ =
3α + βc
4β
, w˜ =
α + βc
2β
, π˜m =
(α− βc)2
8β
,
π˜d =
γ(α− βc)2
16β
, π˜c =
(1− γ)[γ2(α − βc)2 − 4s2]
16βr2
.
The equilibrium where s is provided is summarized in Table 1. As is the case in our paper,
the decentralized channel does not achieve the maximum proﬁt that the channel can potentially
generate due to the fact that the retail price is always higher than the channel proﬁt optimizing
price p∗.
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3. Quantity Discount and Channel Coordination
The channel-coordinating quantity discount schedule can be easily derrived in the same way as in
our paper. It is given by
t∗(q) =
(
α
β
− q − s
βγ
)(
1− k
∗
1
γ
+
k∗1(1− γ)s
qγ
)
+
k∗1c
γ
(
1− (1− γ)s
q
)
− 1− k
∗
2
q
f. (10)
We determine k∗1 and k∗2 in the above schedule following the same steps detailed in our paper
(Appendix A), and they are
k∗1 =
γ(α− βc− s)[(Nγ + γ − 1)(α − βc− s) + 2Ns]
(α− βc− s− 2Ns)[(2Nr + r − 1)(α − βc) + (1 + 2N − γ)s] , (11)
k∗2 =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if 0 ≤ f ≤ k
∗
1
s(2α−2βc+s)
4β
k∗1
s(2α−2βc+s)
4βf if k
∗
1
s(2α−2βc+s)
4β < f ≤ fc.
(12)
Note that the optimal quantity discount schedule in equation (10) is nonlinear in q here, more
complex than the corresponding schedule in our paper. This is due to the fact that our paper spec-
iﬁes a simple relationship between Qd and Qm or Qm = Qd/γ. That relationship is more complex
here, given by Qm = s + (Qd − s)/γ. However, it is straightforward to verify that the qualitative
nature of this schedule has not changed. Given our assumption about α, we can show 0 < k∗1 < γ
and dt
∗(q)
dq |f=0< 0.
The payoﬀ for the manufacturer under this quantity discount schedule is given by
πdm =
⎧⎨
⎩
(1−k∗1)(α−βc+s)2
4β if 0 ≤ f ≤ k∗1 s(2α−2βc+s)4β
(1−k∗1)(α−βc+s)2
4β − (1− k∗2)f if k∗1 s(2α−2βc+s)4β < f ≤ fc.
(13)
4. Two-Part Tariﬀs and Channel Coordination
The derrivation of the channel coordinating menu of two-part tariﬀs follows the same process as
described in Section 4 of our paper (and also Appendix B). Again, the key to coordinating this
dominant retailer channel is to motivate the retailer to set its price at p∗ and the manufacturer can
do so only if it sets w∗d =
βγc−(1−γ)s
βγ . Under the new speciﬁcation, the dominant retailer has more
3
an incentive to mark-up on the wholesale price when s is provided so that the manufacturer must
lower its wholesale price to motivate the provision of s. Then, to determine Fd, Fc, and wc, the
manufacturer solves the following optimization problem:
max
(Fd,Fc,wc)
βγ(1− γ)(α− βc− s)(wc − c)− (1− γ)s(αγ − βcγ + (2− γ)s)
2βγ
+ Fd + NFc (1)
Fd ≤ [γ(α− βc) + (2− γ)s]
2
4βγ
− f, (2)
Fc ≤ (1− γ)(α− βc− s)[α + s + β(c− 2wc)]4βN , (3)
Fd − Fc ≥ (1− γ)(α− βc− s)[(1− γ)s + βr(wc − c)]2βNγ (4)
Fd − Fc ≤ [βγ(wc − c) + (1− γ)s][2αγ + (3− γ)s− βγ(wc + c)]4βγ . (5)
It can be shown that the optimal solution requires that constraints (3) and (5) are both binding
and constraint (2) is not. In other words, the manufacturer will take all surplus away from fringe
retailers but not from the dominant retailer. From the two binding constraints, we can solve for Fc
and Fd, all as a function of wc. Substituting them into the target function (1), we can see that the
target function is strictly concave in wc. Thus, we can proceed to ﬁnd the optimal wc and then Fc
and Fd. The solutions are given below:
Fc =
{
0 if 0 ≤ f ≤ fd
(1−γ)(α−βc−s)[βγ(4f+cs)−s(αγ+(1−γ)s)]
4βNγs if fd < f ≤ fc,
(6)
Fd =
{
3[αγ−βcγ+(2−γ)s]2
16βγ if 0 ≤ f ≤ fd
F¯d if fd < f ≤ fc,
(7)
wc =
{
p∗ if 0 ≤ f ≤ fd
ws if fd < f ≤ fc, (8)
πm =
{
(4−γ)γ(α−βc)2+s[2γ(2+γ)(α−βc)−(4−8γ+γ2)s]
16βγ if 0 ≤ f ≤ fd
π¯m if fd < f ≤ fc,
(9)
where
F¯d =
1
16βNγs2
{−4β2γ[4f2Nγ + 4cf(1− γ)s− c2(Nγ + γ − 1)s2]
4
+ s2[4α2γ(Nγ + γ − 1)− 4α(1 − (3 + 4N)γ + 2(1 + N)γ2)s
+ (4(1− γ)2 + N(15 − 16γ + 4γ2))s2]− 4βs[2αγ(2f(γ − 1) + c(−1 + γ + Nγ)s)
+ s(2f(2 + N − 2γ)γ + c(−1 + (3 + 4N)γ − 2(1 + N)γ2)s)]} (10)
π¯m =
1
16βNγs2
{−4β2γ[4f2Nγ + 4cf(1− γ)s− c2(N + γ − 1)s2]
+ s2[4α2γ(N + γ − 1) + 4α(−1 + (3 + 2N)γ − 2γ2)s
+ (4(1− γ)2 + N(4γ − 1))s2]− 4βs[2αγ(2f(γ − 1) + c(−1 + γ + N)s)
+ s(2f(2 + N − 2γ)γ + c(−1 + 3γ + 2Nγ − 2γ2)s)]} (11)
5. Winners and Losers of Channel Coordination
Due to the complexity of the payoﬀ expressions, it is no longer possible to determine precisely under
what conditions a quantity discount schedule may dominate a menu of two-part tariﬀs, even with
the aid of Mathematica. However, we note that with this alternative speciﬁcation, the process of
the derivations has not changed qualitatively, generating similar expressions. Furthermore, with a
suﬃciently small s, we know that this alternative model converges to the model in our paper so that
all conclusions in our paper should carry over. Although we cannot determine precisely how small s
has to be relative to other parameters, we know that s does not have to be very small. For instance,
if we let γ = 0.6, N = 3, α = 15, β = 0.5, s = 0.5, and c = 1 (all our assumptions are satisﬁed),
we will have fc = 7.45, k∗1
s(2α−2βc+s)
4β = 2.566, and fd = 3.71. It is then straightforward to show
that for all 0 < f ≤ 6.5, the menu of two-part tariﬀs dominates the quantity discount schedule
in coordinating the channel and for 6.5 < f ≤ 7.45, the quantity discount schedule dominates.
Furthermore, channel coordination with the optimally-chosen coordination mechanism is always
more proﬁtable for the manufacturer than if the channel is not coordinated. Both conclusions are
qualitatively the same as in our paper, as seen from Figure 2 in our paper where one simply ﬁxes
γ and let f vary.
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6. Zero-Sum Service Provision
Alternatively, consider a dominant-retailer channel characterized by the following demand func-
tions:
Qd = γ(α− βp + s), (12)
Qc = (1− γ)(α− βp− s), (13)
Qm = α− βp. (14)
In this case, the manufacturer has no incentive to encourage the provision of service for two
reasons. First, the total demand for the manufacturer is not elastic with regard to the service
provision. Second, the service provision will increase the sales made by the dominant retailer, an
outcome that the manufacture does not want to see happening (the manufacturer can take all proﬁt
away from the competitive fringe).
There are two reasons as to why this model is not be as interesting as it may ﬁrst appear.
First, the incentives introduced by this model are counter-factual. Second, if s is suﬃciently small,
this model will converge to the previous model. Here s must be suﬃciently small relative to other
parameters in our model.
6
